Stereotypes
One of themselves, a prophet of their own, said, “Cretans are always liars, evil beasts, lazy gluttons.” Titus 1:12 NASB
Cretans – Crete has an ancient history. Home to the Minoans, significant to the Mycenaeans, and a major port island in the Roman Empire, Crete plays a role in the Mediterranean for thousands of years. Even Paul has something to say about it and its people. But what he says has become a rather famous example of a paradox.
Liar paradox, also called Epimenides’ paradox, paradox derived from the statement attributed to the Cretan prophet Epimenides (6th century BCE) that all Cretans are liars. If Epimenides’ statement is taken to imply that all statements made by Cretans are false, then, since Epimenides was a Cretan, his statement is false (i.e., not all Cretans are liars). The paradox in its simplest form arises from considering the sentence “This sentence is false.” If the sentence is true, then it is false, and if it is false, then it is true. The study of such semantic paradoxes led some logicians, notably Alfred Tarski, to distinguish between object language and metalanguage and to conclude that no language can consistently contain a complete semantic theory of its own sentences.[1]
The apostle Paul makes reference to Epimenides in Titus 1:12, writing, “It was one of them, their very own prophet who said, ‘Cretans are always liars, vicious brutes, lazy gluttons.” This leaves Paul asserting that Epimenides truly said that he (and all other Cretans) are liars. How are we to understand the truth of Paul’s statement? Is it simply that Paul reports truthfully that Epimenides said this? Does Paul report truthfully something that is self-referentially false? Or does Paul mean to assert that what Epimenides said is true, in which case, it must be false? And, of course, what does this mean for a doctrine of inspiration that claims all statements in the Bible are true because they are the word of God? Is the stereotype true—and then it is false, or is it false because it is true?
You might enjoy a little laugh and a shake of the head over this one. But there is a far more serious implication. Notice the comment “no language can consistently contain a complete semantic theory of its own sentences.” What does this mean? It means that languages are like games where the rules are applied on the playing field, but the rules only make sense in the game. As soon as we step off the playing field and ask about the greater truth of the rules, we discover things like paradoxes, contradictions, and anomalies. The game itself can’t tell us what to do when we leave the field. Theology is like that. Theologians spend a lot of time trying to make their statements consistent with each other. They try to tie their claims to “evidence” in order to justify them. But in the end, paradoxes, contradictions and anomalies always arise. The theological game just isn’t the same as living—and living embraces paradoxes, contradictions, and anomalies all the time. We might be distressed when we can’t develop a complete semantic theory (or a complete theology), but it won’t stop us from living with what we have—and making the best of it.
Maybe what we need to learn from the Liar’s Paradox is that life doesn’t depend on complete theories. We don’t act with perfect practical consistency. We embrace all kinds of strange (and sometimes distressing) behavior without worrying too much if we are being consistent. We live—and let the rest sort of work itself out. Maybe we should read Paul that way, as a kind of practical advisor about how to live rather than a first-century theological author. What do you think?
Topical Index: liar paradox, language, logic, Titus 1:12
