Sex on Demand
If he takes to himself another woman, he may not reduce her food, her clothing, or her conjugal rights. Exodus 21:10 NASB
(first published in February 2014, with additions)
Conjugal rights – If you were ever to doubt the upside-down nature of the Hebraic view of the role of women, this verse would surely seem to confirm that the Hebrew culture stood in utter opposition to the surrounding cultural ideas. Here is a commandment that apparently says that a man must not withhold sex from the woman when she demands it. What a change in our contemporary Christian view of male authority! If this verse actually says that a woman determines the time of sexual intimacy, men will have to make serious changes in their inflated ego perspective.
But, unfortunately, the text isn’t quite so transparent. Tim Hegg and others point out the hapax legomenon (the one-time use of the word) translated “conjugal rights” has no similar parallels in any cognate language and seems to be at odds with other implications about marriage in Scripture. The problem is that the context of this passage is about the treatment of a woman who was once a slave but became a man’s wife. If the man takes another wife, then certain obligations pertain. But the suggestion that one of those obligations is continued sexual intimacy on demand implies an endorsement of polygamy. That creates an issue. Ruth Magnusson Davis addresses this problem. CLICK HERE
So if it is such an issue and probably should be translated in other ways, why do some of the rabbis still treat the verse as though it places the power of conjugal intimacy in the hands of the woman? If I wanted to eliminate the potential endorsement of polygamy, why not just adopt the translations favored by Hegg? The answer is tradition! Traditional interpretations of the word ‘onatah (the hapax legomenon) render it as “marital rights” or “conjugal rights.” It is not easy to simply dismiss interpretations of a word that date back centuries and centuries even if it creates other problems. There is no incentive for the rabbis to interpret the text in the traditional way, but they do so, nevertheless. That raises questions. Since the word is a one-time occurrence in the Scriptures, no one actually knows for sure what it means; no one except Moses and the people of the original audience and they are not available for consultation. So what do we do?
Sarna offers the following comment: “The laws of Lipit-Ishtar similarly stipulate that if a man takes a second wife, now his favorite, he must continue to support his first wife. The Torah extends this protection to the slave girl and here specifies three basic necessities of life to which she is entitled. . . . The Septuagint, Peshitta and Targums all understood [the word ‘onatah] to refer to the woman’s conjugal rights. This interpretation, which has no philological support, is also found in rabbinic sources. If correct, it would reflect a singular recognition in the laws of the ancient Near East that a wife is legally entitled to sexual gratification. . . . A persuasive, although as yet philologically unsustained, argument has been made for understanding the term to mean ‘oil, ointment.’ In many ancient Near Eastern texts there are clauses that make provision for ‘food, clothing, and ointment.’”[1]
One of the principles of exegesis is that the more difficult text is probably the original text. This is based on the tendency of men to soften the meaning of a text in order to make it more palatable. If we apply this principle here, we will move toward the interpretation that the woman has the right to sexual intimacy. While no one can be certain of the exact meaning of the term, and we recognize that there is evidence for alternative readings, it seems that the distinctive difference of Torah is to be found in the harder reading, that is, the reading that suggests that the woman has authority over sexual interaction. If it were not for the implications of polygamy, this alone would not be a problem, although it certainly stands in opposition to the usual patriarchal view.
There is one other consideration here. If this verse is about the rights of the first wife (or slave who has become a wife) when another wife is in the mix, I think it fair to suggest that if there is another wife, she became the second wife because the husband found her favorable, perhaps more so than his first wife. If not, why take a second? If this is the case, this verse prevents the husband from withholding intercourse from the first wife, an action that could jeopardize her ability to have children and therefore, have standing. We have an example of this in Abraham. Even though Sarah proposed the conceptual solution of children through Hagar, the result was that Abraham began to favor Hagar. The first wife felt betrayed and abandoned—and proceeded to punish the ex-slave (wife) Hagar. Sarah’s solution backfired. Could it be that this story stands behind such an unusual verse? The man must continue to have sexual relations with the first wife because she deserves status in the tribal community. He must continue to provide her with the possibility of children who will carry his name.
Granted, the pronouns are ambiguous. Does the verse read “he may not reduce her [the first wife’s] food,” etc. or does it read “he may not reduce her [the second woman’s] food,” etc.? The rabbis read it as referring to the first wife, as in the case of Abraham. This seems to make sense to me. Why would a man have to be commanded not to reduce food, clothing, and sex for a woman he has chosen when he already has another partner? If anything, he would provide even more for this second sexual partner, as men tend to do with modern mistresses. It’s the first wife whose status is reduced, not the second.
But it’s still a hapax legomenon. You will have to decide. Which is it?
Topical Index: conjugal rights, authority, ‘onatah, hapax legomenon, Exodus 21:10
[1] Nahum Sarna, The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus, p. 121.
